CONSTITUTIONAL

POSSESSION OF A FIREARM DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE; AND A FEDERAL LAW, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q),
LAW-COMMERCE

CLAUSE-MERE

MAKING MERE POSSESSION A CRIME, EXCEEDS CONGRESSIONAL

POWER PURSUANT TO THE COMMERCE CLAUSE-United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
The debate over the division of powers in a governmental system based on federalism 1 sparks fierce controversy. 2 As history
reveals, such controversies can ultimately lead to civil war.' More
often, however, they are peacefully resolved by the Supreme Court,
which is responsible for articulating the constitutional balance between the states and the federal government. 4 Recent case law indicates that the Court has varied its decisions so often and, in fact,
1 "Federalism" is "[t]he federal (national) government and individual state govemment principle of organization. Term which includes interrelationships among
the states and relationship between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 424 (6th ed. 1991). The United States was born federalist pursuant
to the Constitution; there was no choice or coercion to become a federalist society.
See HenryJ. Friendly, Federalism: A Forward,86YALE L.J. 1019, 1019 (1977). Presently,
the United States is "in the midst of a confused era for federalism doctrine." Mark
Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REv.
1623, 1623 (1994). Since the formation of our nation, jurists have been confused as
to the proper relationship between federal and state powers. Deborah Jones Merritt,
Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formulafor the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1563
(1994).
Deborah Jones Merritt's article offered three distinct approaches used by the
Court in attempting to define the proper relationship. Id. First, noted Merritt, is the
territorial model. Id. at 1564. Under this approach, goods are labeled as either stateor nationally-regulated. Id. Violations occur under the territorial model when the
federal government attempts to invade an area specifically left to the states. Id. Second is the federal process model. Id. at 1566. Under this approach, a state's powers
are protected by the structure of the federal government, not through judicially-imposed limitations on the range of federal regulatory power. Id. The third approach,
the autonomy model, is the one most recently used by the Court. Id. at 1570 (citation
omitted). Under this approach, courts should intervene to protect a state's sovereignty only upon the federal government's tampering with the relationship between a
.state government and its voters." Id. at 1570-71. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism,47
VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1369-95 (1994) (providing a structural history ofjudicial enforcement of federalism norms from 1800 to the present and discussing the Supreme
Court's history of protecting state sovereignty).
2 American Survey, Nine for the Seesaw, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1985, at 21. See
generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITnTIONAL LAw § 6.3, at 404 (2d ed.

1988) (discussing the original interpretations of the Commerce Clause).
S Nine for the Seesaw, supra note 2, at 21.
4 Id.; see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 66-67 (12th ed. 1991) (noting
the early conflicts addressed by the Supreme Court).
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so radically, that the definition has ultimately become blurred.5
The first judicial concepts of federalism were enunciated in
1793 in Chisholm v. Georgia.6 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the State of Georgia's claim of immunity
from a lawsuit by a private citizen.7 The decision was immediately
faced with harsh criticism, 8 but nevertheless expressed the
Supreme Court's notion that the individual states could be subject
to the national judicial process.9
The Framers of our nation's Constitution established a form
of government premised on enumerated powers.10 This structure
dictates that the federal government may only employ those powers granted to it under the Constitution." Among such enumerated powers granted to Congress, however, was the ability to adopt
any legislation "necessary and proper"1 2 to achieve a congressional
5 Nine for the Seesaw, supra note 2, at 21; see infra note 101 and accompanying text
(noting the Supreme Court's treatment of Commerce Clause issues in recent case law).
6 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
7 See ALPHEUS T. MASON & DONALD G. STEPHENSON, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 122, 135 (9th ed. 1990). On October 31, 1777, the Executive Council of
Georgia authorized two state commissioners to purchase certain merchandise from
Robert Farquhar, a South Carolina merchant, for an agreed sum of $169,613.33. Id.
Before receiving the money, Farquhar died. Id. The State appointed Alexander
Chisholm as Farquhar's executor and proceeded to pursue the debt from the State of
Georgia. Id. Georgia refused to pay, and Chisholm brought suit for the debt in the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Georgia. Id. Georgia defended on the
basis of its sovereign and independent status pursuant to the Constitution. Id. Thus,
it was exempt from being named a party to any lawsuit brought by a non-Georgia
citizen. Id. The circuit court initially accepted this assertion. Id. Subsequently,
Chisholm brought his suit to the Supreme Court. Id. No representative of Georgia
appeared before the Court after several invitations; accordingly, the Court entered
judgment for Chisholm on February 19, 1793. Id.
8 Id. On the same day as the Chisholm decision, the House filed a resolution seeking an amendment to the Constitution, and the next day the Senate followed with a
supportive resolution. Id. On March 4, 1794, Congress proposed the Eleventh
Amendment, which was ratified in 11 months. Id. The Eleventh Amendment states:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
9 MASON & STEPHENSON, supra note 7, at 125.
10 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). Chief Justice
Marshall explained:
This [federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted
to it. ..is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the
extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will
probably continue to arise, so long as our system shall exist.
Id.

11 Id.
12

Id. at 411-12, 420. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides that "Congress
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goal."3 This ability led Congress to allot itself a number of implied
powers."
These implied powers, arising out of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, came into direct conflict with the states' abilities to regulate and exercise
their police powers' 5 under the Tenth
6
Amendment.'

At the forefront of these conflicts between the federal and
shall have the power... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
13 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-14; see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 5.2, at
298-300 (discussing the doctrine of enumerated powers).
14 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406 (explaining that the Framers of the Constitution intended to create "implied" federal powers). "Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is
no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers ....
Id.; see also GuNTHER, supranote 4, at 77 (oudining the
historical context of the Necessary and Proper Clause and Congress's implied national powers). According to Gunther, the Framers of the Constitution never discussed the Necessary and Proper Clause at the Constitutional Convention. Gunther,
supra note 4 at 78. The clause, however, was discussed in great detail during the
ratification years of the Constitution because many people feared a strong, centralized government. Id. Moreover, noted Gunther, those in favor of the Constitution
insisted that the clause was "harmless" and that the objections to the clause were "pretext." Id. "Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that
all particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have
resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication." Id.
15 "Police power" is defined as:
An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the
Tenth Amendment, U.S. Const., upon the individual states, and, in
turn, delegated to local governments, through which they are enabled
to establish a special department of police; adopt such laws and regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud and crime, and secure
generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the public order, preventing a conflict of rights in
the common intercourse of the citizens, and insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges conferred upon him or her by
the general laws. The power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the
public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to limitations
of the federal and State constitutions, and especially to the requirement
of due process. Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a
government to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of
government.
BLAC 's LAw DICTIONARY 801 (6th ed. 1991).
16 Alan N. Greenspan, The ConstitutionalExercise of the FederalPolice Power: A Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1988). According to Greenspan, the expansion of a federal police power pursuant to the Commerce Clause
disturbs the delicate balance of the federal system. Id. Greenspan noted further that
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state governments were cases involving the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate commerce.1 7 The Supreme Court first dethe demise of federalism, resulting from increased federal power, could threaten individual rights on the theory of regulation without sufficient representation. Id.
The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment
should be seen as an umbrella that protects a whole constellation of state rights and
obligations, and it is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine which rights are
protected by the Tenth Amendment umbrella and which restrictions may be imposed
on the states without piercing this umbrella. Robert H. Freilich, Returningto a General
Theory of Federalism: Framinga New Tenth Amendment United States Supreme Court Case, 26
URB. LAw. 215, 217 (1994) (citing Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule
in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269, 293 (1968)).
The Framers intended the Tenth Amendment as a means to preserve state
power. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 14
(1950). When state and national powers conflict, however, the state's power must
yield. Id. But see Ronald A. Giller, FederalGun Control in the United States: Revival of the
Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 151, 162-76 (1994) (detailing the
history of the Tenth Amendment while focusing on congressional powers arising pursuant to the Commerce Clause); Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay
on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal
Power, 41 KAN. L. REv. 493, 496 (1993) (claiming that the federal government has
become ubiquitous in terms of its regulations on every aspect of daily life).
The Supreme Court cases dealing with Congress's prohibition of activities deleterious to public safety illustrates this struggle between the state's police power and the
power of Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See TRiBE, supra
note 2, § 5-6 at 312-13; see also Greenspan, supra at 1024-28 (discussing Congress's
success in enacting public protection legislation). See generally Richard A. Epstein, The
Proper Scope of the Commerce Clause, 73 VA. L. Rv. 1387, 1421-28 (1987) (discussing
various Supreme Court decisions involving congressional regulation of harmful activities flowing through interstate commerce).
In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), Congress passed legislation that
prohibited the shipment of any good in interstate commerce that was manufactured
in any facility that was in violation of the federal act. Id. at 1427. Because the legislation at issue in Hammer failed to require that the specific good must travel through
interstate commerce, and instead simply required that the manufacturer produce
some good that was made by children in violation of the Act, the Supreme Court
struck down the regulation as an improper use of the Commerce Clause. Id.
17 See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1888) (upholding the police power
of a state to restrict the manufacture of liquor); The Steamer Daniel Ball v. United
States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564-65 (1871) [hereinafter The Daniel Ball] (holding
that Congress could regulate the licensing of ships operating solely intrastate if the
cargo that those ships were carrying were involved with any form of interstate movement); Veazie v. Moor, 14 U.S. (1 How.) 568, 573-75 (1852) (rejecting a Commerce
Clause attack on a state-granted monopoly to operate steamships entirely within intrastate waters); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 566-68 (1850) (holding that Congress's power to regulate commerce included the power to exclude
commerce and, thus, Congress could prohibit the importation of counterfeit currency); Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824) (declaring a federallygranted monopoly to operate steamships superior to a state-granted right); Epstein,
supra note 16, at 1393-1408 (breaking down the text of the Commerce Clause and
analyzing its application prior to 1937).
"Commerce" is:
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fined the scope of Congress's power to regulate commerce in Gibboris v. Ogden, 8 holding that a state-granted monopoly with respect
to navigable waters was subordinate to a federally-licensed activity
involving the same waters.1 9 The early Commerce Clause2" debates
following Gibbons focused on whether commerce was analogous to

manufacturing.2 1 During the next 150 years, the Supreme Court's
[T]he exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the
buying, selling, and exchanging of articles. The transportation of persons and property by land, water and air. Intercourse by way of trade
and traffic between different peoples or states and the citizens or inhabitants thereof, including not only the purchase, sale, and exchange
of commodities, but also the instrumentalities and agencies by which it
is promoted and the means and appliances by which it is carried on,
and transportation of persons as well as of goods, both by land and sea.
Also interchange of ideas, sentiments, etc., as between man and man.
The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation,
or communication among the several States, or between the District of
Columbia, or any Territory... or between points in the same State but
through any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia or any
foreign country.
BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARv 183 (6th ed. 1991).
18 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See infra notes 46-53.
19 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210-11.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall
have the Power to... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.; see Jacques Leboeuf, The Economics of
Federalism and the ProperScope of the Federal Commerce Powers, 31 SAN Dmco L. REv. 555,
592-607 (1994) (noting the Framers' intentions in constructing the powers of the
Commerce Clause). The majority of today's federal power may be traced back to this
particular clause in the Constitution. Epstein, supra note 16, at 1387. The Commerce
Clause powers developed and expanded into three distinct areas: instrumentalities of
commerce, regulation of goods traveling through interstate commerce, and those
cases examining the subtlety between commerce and manufacturing among the
states. Id. at 1409-10.
The Court has applied the instrumentalities of commerce theory and has upheld
an order by the Interstate Commerce Commission that fixed intrastate railroad rates
because of their effect on interstate commerce. Houston, E. & W Tex. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 234 U.S. 342, 354, 358 (1914) [hereinafter Shreveport Rate Case]. The Court
announced that "Congress is empowered to regulate-that is, to provide the law for
the government of interstate commerce; to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its
'protection and advancement[.]'" Id. at 351 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) at 564). See supra note 16 for a discussion of the scope of regulation of goods
flowing through interstate commerce. See infra note 21 for an overview of the
Supreme Court's treatment of the distinction between commerce and manufacturing.
21 In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., the Government sought to enjoin the American Sugar Refining Company, which controlled a significant majority of the sugarrefining companies within the United States, from acquiring the E.C. Knight Company and three other companies. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9
(1895). The Government contended that the proposed acquisition violated the Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1994), which makes it illegal for anyone to enter
into a contract that interferes with trade or commerce between the states or who seeks
to monopolize in any aspect involving commerce among the states. Id. at 6-7. The

902

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:897

treatment of the Commerce Clause enabled Congress to regulate
many activities that were generally considered to be left to the
states as provided by the Tenth Amendment. 22 As Congress continued to federalize those areas presumed to belong to the states, seri23
ous doubt arose regarding the vitality of the Tenth Amendment.
In a recent case, United States v. Lopez, 24 the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q),25 which criminalizes possession of a firearm within the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, holding that the acquisition of the E.C. Knight Company along with the
other three companies was for private gain and in no way related to interstate commerce either between states or foreign nations. Id. at 17. In reaching this decision,
Chief Justice Fuller quoted the following language, expressed in Kidd v. Pearson:
"No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly
expressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufacture and commerce. Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning
of raw materials into a change of form for use. The functions of commerce are different. The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce ......
Id. at 14 (quoting Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888)).
22 Ronald A. Giller, supra note 16, at 157. Giller rejected the 19th century view
mandating the rigid separation of federal and state governments to preserve their
coexistence as equivalent sovereign entities. Id.; see also Martha A. Field, The Supreme
Court, 1984 Term: Comment: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority:
The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARv. L. REv. 84, 84 (1985) (discussing the increase of federal Commerce Clause power as it relates to the passing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments).
23 Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm than Good: Assessing Federalization of
CriminalLaw, 79 MINN. L. REv. 455, 459-60 (1994). Noting the proliferation of federal
statutes, Chippendale indicated a yearly increase of 70% of criminal case filings in the
federal courts. Id. at 456; see also Robert D. Raven, Don't Wage War on Crime in Federal
Courts, TEx. LAW., August 31, 1992, at 12 (noting the increased volume of criminal
case filings in federal courts). ChiefJustice Rehnquist informed Congress in his 1992
State of the Judiciary Report that the federal courts are experiencing a "caseload crisis." Raven, supra, at 12. The predominant reason set forth is the federalization of
criminal law. Id. Currently, there are more than 3000 federal offenses, each separate
and distinct from one another. Chippendale, supra at 455-56. United States District
Judge Judith Keep asserted that the courts are overwhelmed by the amount of criminal cases and that they have turned into somewhat of a "police court." Raven, supra at
12. There is now a serious push, apparently headed by the Supreme Court, to decrease the number of criminal cases in the federal court system and return such cases
back to the state courts. Id. at 12-13. Doing so, argues Raven, would give the states
the deference and respect dictated by the principles of federalism. Id. at 13.
24 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
9
25 Section 22(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 provides in part:
(1) The Congress finds and declares that (A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nationwide problem;
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs, guns, and criminal gangs;
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce
and have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as
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confines of an area that a person knows or should know is a local
school zone.2 6 The Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) did not fall
within the scope of the Commerce Clause power because the mere
possession of a handgun in or around a school does not substantially affect interstate commerce. 7
documented in numerous hearings in both the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives and Judiciary Committee of the Senate;
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts, ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are
made have considerably moved in interstate commerce;
(E) while criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens and foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of
the country due to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and
parents may decline to send their children to school for the same
reason;
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in
a decline in the quality of education in our country;
(G) the decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact
on interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
(H) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible
to handle gun-related crime by themselves; even States, localities, and
school systems that have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and
punish gun-related crime find their efforts unavailing due in part to the
failure or inability of other States or localities to take strong measures;
and
(I) Congress has power, under the interstate commerce clause and
other provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the
integrity and safety of the Nation's schools by enactment of this
subsection.
(2)
(A) It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone ....
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
26 See id.; see also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. The Act defines a "school zone" as the
area "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (1994). The term "school" is defined by Congress as "a school
which provides elementary or secondary education under State law." 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a) (26) (1994).
27 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. Lopez arrived at the Supreme Court after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990 was an unconstitutional statute, outside the powers given to Congress by the
Commerce Clause. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), reh'g
denied, 9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). This decision of the
court of appeals was significant because it ignored precedent established by prior
Supreme Court decisions mandating the "rational basis" form of review. See, e.g.,
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (noting the Court's
deference to congressional findings when reviewing activities affecting interstate commerce); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (stating that the Court must yield to any congressional finding that a particular activity affects interstate commerce, provided there is a rational basis for such a
finding); see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland v. Wirtz,
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On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., arrived at school in
possession of a concealed .38 caliber handgun.28 School officials,
acting on an anonymous tip, confronted and questioned Lopez,
who thereafter admitted to carrying the weapon. 29 Authorities
charged Lopez with violating section 46.03(a),(1) of the Texas Penal Code,3 0 which prohibits the possession of a firearm on school
premises.3 1 The following day, however, federal agents charged
Lopez with violating 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (1) (a) and, as a result, the
2
state charges against Lopez were dismissed.
Following the filing of the complaint against Lopez and the
subsequent grand jury indictment, Lopez filed a motion with the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to
dismiss the complaint.3 3 In denying the motion for dismissal, the
district court held that § 922(q) was a constitutional exercise of
392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968), which stated that the Court's investigation is at an end upon
determining that Congress possessed a rational basis to regulate an activity affecting
interstate commerce).
Three months after the Fifth Circuit decided Lopez, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in holding that 18
U.S.C. § 9 22(q) was constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
power in United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. filed, Mar. 25,
1994 (No. 93-8487). SeeJames M. Maloney, Note, Shootingfor an Omnipotent Congress:
The Constitutionality of FederalRegulation of IntrastateFirearmsPossession,62 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 1795, 1822-23 (1994) (noting that the decision by the court of appeals in Lopez
was more consistent with the concepts of federalism than the decision reached by the
court of appeals in Edwards). Subsequently, the Supreme Court remanded Edwards to
the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration. United States v. Edwards, 55 F.3d 428, 428 (9th
Cir. 1995). On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, citing the Court's
holding in Lopez. Id.
28 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Lopez, at the time of his arrest, was a 12th-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas. Id. Although the gun was not
loaded, Lopez also had in his possession five bullets. Id.
29 Id. Upon questioning Lopez, school officials learned that the gun had been
given to Lopez by a fellow student and that he was to deliver the gun to a third student. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345. Lopez acknowledged that the gun was to be used in a
"gang war" and that he was to receive 40 dollars upon delivering the gun. Id.
30 The relevant part of the statute under which Lopez was initially charged states:
§ 46.03. Places Weapons Prohibited
(a) A person commits an offense if, with a firearm, illegal knife,
club, or prohibited weapon listed in Section 46.05 (a) [not provided
here], he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly goes:
(1) on the physical premises of a school, an educational institution, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or an educational institution, whether the school or educational institution is public
or private, unless pursuant to written regulations or written authorization of the institution.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a) (1) (West Supp. 1994).
31 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
32 Id.; see supra note 25, for the text of § 922(q).
33 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
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congressional power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 4 In an
unpublished opinion, the district court judge, sitting without a
jury," found Lopez guilty of knowingly possessing a firearm in a
school zone. 6
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, Lopez again challenged the constitutionality of § 922(q) as
an excessive use of Congress's Commerce Clause power.37 Writing
for the court in a per curiam opinion, 8 Judge Garwood reversed
Lopez's conviction, stating that § 9 22 (q) in its then present format
was an unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause power.39
Judge Garwood found that the Government failed to allege a nexus
between Lopez's possession of the gun and interstate commerce.40
Id.; see also Lopez 2 F.3d at 1345 (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) is a constitutional means of regulation under the Commerce Clause and that interstate commerce is affected by the "business" of education, specifically at the elementary,
middle, and high school levels).
35 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (noting that Lopez's right to a trial by jury was waived).
36 Id. Lopez received a six-month sentence followed by a two-year supervised release from the district court. Id.
37 Lopez 2 F.3d at 1345. The circuit court stipulated that the only objection raised
by Lopez was the constitutionality of § 9 22(q). Id. Thus, the circuit court did not
have to consider Lopez's guilt or innocence. Id.
38 Id. at 1342; see Deborah L. Farmer, Recent Development, United States v. Lopez:
The Fifth Circuit Declares The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 an UnconstitutionalExtension of CongressionalPower Under the Commerce Clause, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1674 (1994) (analyzing and synthesizing the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Lopez).
39 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367-68. Section 9 2 2 (q), at the time it was reviewed by the court
of appeals, did not contain the preamble now provided in § 9 2 2(q)(1). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 9 2 2 (q)(1). The statute started with the language that is now § 922(q) (2) (A). Id.
Judge Garwood expressly left open the question regarding the constitutionality of
§ 9 22 (q) in other scenarios. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368. The Fifth Circuit's holding was,
therefore, narrow. Id. The court simply stated that Congress had failed to bring
§ 9 2 2(q) within the realm of the Commerce Clause in the immediate case. Id. Moreover, the court concluded that Lopez's conviction would still have been reversedeven though the gun that Lopez possessed had been manufactured in another statebecause the Government failed to allege any connection to interstate commerce. Id.
40 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368. However, Judge Garwood surmised that a conviction
under § 9 2 2 (q) could be possible if the Government were to show the requisite nexus
in a future case. Id. The court began its analysis to determine whether such nexus is
needed by exploring Supreme Court precedent, specifically United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971). Id. at 1347; see also David S. Gehrig, Note, The Gun-FreeSchool Zones
Act: The Shootout Over Legislative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and Federalism,22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179, 195-96 (1994) (discussing the relationship between Bass and
Lopez in greater detail).
In Bass, the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether such a nexus to
interstate commerce must be shown when the Government is prosecuting for the possession of a firearm. Bass, 404 U.S. at 338. In answering this question in the affirmative, the Bass Court announced that without some showing of a nexus between the
activity sought to be regulated and interstate commerce, the statute at issue substantially interferes with traditional state criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 350; see Gehrig, supra,
34
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Moreover, the appellate court held that a nexus was an essential
component for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q)."1
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted the
Government's petition for certiorari.42 In affirming the holding of
the circuit court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
stated that the mere possession of a firearm does not substantially
affect interstate commerce.4" The Chief Justice remarked that in
order to reinstate the conviction under § 922(q), the Government
must show that the actions of the defendant substantially affect interstate commerce.44 Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist conat 197 (noting that most prior federal firearm statutes mandated a nexus to interstate
commerce for each individual case); Maloney, supra note 27, at 1815-16 (referring to
the Second Circuit's ruling in Bass that indicated by allowing prosecution under the
statute without showing a nexus to interstate commerce federal power would be extended to an unprecedented level). But see Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S.
563, 575 (1977) (finding that to support the required nexus, all that need be shown is
that the firearm had, at some time, traveled through interstate commerce).
41 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368; see also Giller, supra note 16, at 165 (stating that absent a
distinct nexus between interstate commerce and gun possession within a school zone,
the statute was unconstitutional).
42 United States v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that the petition for certiorari was granted due to the significance of the issue. United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
43 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
44 Id. at 1632. The Government may have been able to show such a burden on
interstate commerce by either alleging so in its indictment or by offering previous
congressional findings. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368. The Supreme Court then noted the
benefits of Congressional findings in interpreting the intent of congressional statutes.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (footnote omitted).
Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed two arguments made by the Government in
regard to interpreting congressional statutes. Id. at 1631-32. The first was that Congress, typically, did not have to show such findings when passing legislation. Id. at
1631; see, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (noting that in order to
legislate, Congress does not have to make particularized findings); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (declaring that the Court, in the
absence of such findings, is to presume all the necessary facts that would support the
congressional legislation and that such legislation should not be pronounced unconstitutional unless, considering all express and presumed facts, the Court finds that
there was no rational basis for such legislation). Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that Congress is not typically required to formulate findings tojustify its legislation, but stated that a finding in the immediate case, involving Lopez, would have
aided the Government's position. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
The second argument was that Congress had, through prior legislation, "accumulated institutional expertise regarding the regulation of firearms." Id. (citing Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (declaring that when
Congress repeatedly legislates in a specific area, its members acquire experience that
reduces the need. for prolonged debate or new hearings in subsequent legislation
involving similar matters)). ChiefJustice Rehnquist posited that this argument is not
applicable to Congress's enactment of § 9 22(q) because its scope reached beyond that
of its past firearm legislation. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (citing Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366).
The circuit court's opinion in Lopez reveals that when Congress introduced the
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cluded that because of the lack of Congressional findings clarifying
the connection of firearms to interstate commerce, § 9 2 2(q) could
not be upheld in the instant case.4 5
The genesis of the Supreme Court's rulings regarding Congress's ability to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause extends back to 1824 and the landmark decision of Gibbons v.
Ogden.' In Gibbons, the Court confronted the problem of deciphering between two individuals' state-granted right to monopolize
the operation of steamships within the state's waterways and a third
individual's right, pursuant to a federal license, to operate his
steamships in those same waterways. 4 7 More specifically, the Court
defined the parameters of the Commerce Clause power and the
extent to which that power could be applied.4 8
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, it was to be included as part of a different federal
law. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1358-59. Further, the circuit court noted that the House Report
on the Crime Control Act made absolutely no mention of the impact that firearms
had on interstate commerce, as did past legislation regarding the possession of firearms. Id. at 1359. Moreover, no member of Congress, in advocating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 by lengthy floor statements, made reference to its relationship to interstate commerce. Id. at 1360. Finally, the circuit court noted that President Bush expressed general criticism before signing the Act. Id. President Bush
specifically stated that the Act "'inappropriately overrides legitimate State firearms
laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law."' Id. (quotation omitted). President
Bush further stated that "[t]he policies reflected in ... [this] provision could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be imposed on the States by the
Congress." Id.
45 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
46 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
47 Id. at 1-2. Respondent, Ogden, received the rights to the monopoly of New York
waters by assignment. Id. The assignment stated that respondent would be the sole
navigator of any boat powered by fire or steam. Id. at 2. Petitioner, Gibbons, engaged
in navigating the waters within New York's border pursuant to a federal licensing act
which was entitled: "An act for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same." Id.
48 Id. at 194-96. Gibbons argued that the powers held by the states are concurrent
with those of Congress. Id. at 24. Therefore, he argued that the states are free to
regulate an area of interest until the federal government regulates that area through
constitutional measures. Id. at 19. However, while admitting this concurrent power,
Gibbons further argued that the state's power is subordinate to the federal power. Id.
at 24. Thus, when the two powers conflict with one another, the federal laws must
take precedence. Id. at 19, 24. Finally, the petitioner stated that Congress must have
sole and exclusive power to regulate commerce. Id. at 12. Hence, the federal license
held by the petitioner must prevail over the state grant to the monopoly. Id. at 27-28.
The Attorney General agreed with the petitioner and further argued that the
monopoly was unconstitutional. Id. at 159. In support of that argument, the Attorney
General noted that the federal government was comprised of enumerated powers. Id.
at 160. Referring to respondent's admission of the presence of implied powers, the
Attorney General stated that all enumerated powers were to be construed strictly, and
the implied powers liberally. Id. at 160-61. Lastly, the Attorney General urged that
the power of the federal government to regulate pursuant the Commerce Clause is
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Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, held that Congress's Commerce Clause power consists of the power to regulate
and prescribe the laws by which commerce is to operate.4 9 This
power, asserted the Chief Justice, is absolute and subject only to
those limits expressly stated in the Constitution.50 Chief Justice
Marshall further explained that the power to regulate commerce
may be stretched to all circumstances involving commerce among
the states.5 1 The Chief Justice noted that such power, in certain
circumstances, could conceivably reach activities occurring within
the borders of a single state.5 2 In so holding, ChiefJustice Marshall
concluded, that the license granted by the federal government
must be superior to the state's grant of the monopoly.55
entirely separate from the power of the state to prohibit under its police powers. Id.
at 178. For a definition of police power, see supra note 15.
Respondent, Ogden, relying heavily on the Tenth Amendment, argued that the
Commerce Clause power could not enjoin the state-granted monopoly. Id. at 34. The
crux of respondent's argument was that the powers under the Commerce Clause must
originate from the Constitution. Id. at 34-35. The respondent concluded that the
federal powers may be either concurrent or exclusive. Id. at 37. If exclusive, then
federal law dictates. Id. If concurrent, such power should reside in the states. Id.
Moreover, respondent proffered that any implied federal power must be concurrent
rather than exclusive. Id. at 36-37. Respondent warned that if this were not so, the
powers of the federal government "would deprive the States almost entirely of sovereignty, as these implied powers must inevitably be very numerous, and must embrace
a wide field of legislation." Id. at 37.
The second argument made by the respondent was also based on the Tenth
Amendment. Id. at 87. The respondent focused on the fact that the Constitution
gave no true power to the states, declaring that such power already existed prior to
the creation of the Constitution. Id. Moreover, this argument rejected the term "concurrent" to describe the relationship between state and federal law. Id. at 88. The
respondent adopted the term "coordinate" instead. Id. Respondent suggested that
the term concurrent led to the constant conclusion that federal was superior to state.
Id. In concluding that the monopoly was beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause
power, respondent argued that such a grant was a valid state exercise of its police
power. Id. at 112-13.
49 Id. at 196.
50 Id. at 197.
51 Id. at 194. According to the ChiefJustice, commerce among the states necessarily is commerce between the states. Id. at 196. ChiefJustice Marshall noted here that
the term among is synonymous with intermingled. Id. at 194. Clarifying, the Court
recognized that although the word among is comprehensive, the Commerce Clause
power may be limited only to commerce that affects more than one state. Id. Chief
Justice Marshall expressly remarked that commerce occurring completely within a
state is reserved for the state to regulate. Id. at 195.
52 Id. at 194.
53 Id. at 210. ChiefJustice Marshall explained that the Framers of the Constitution
foresaw the possibility of conflicts between state and federal laws and provided for
such occurrences by stating that the Constitution is to be considered the supreme law
of the land. Id. at 210-11. The Court declared that in every case in which a state
enacts a law contrary to an act of Congress, or federal treaty, the state action must
yield. Id. at 211. Applying this principle, the Chief Justice concluded that the state-
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In the years following Gibbons, the Court dealt with increasing
amounts of congressional Commerce Clause legislation that regulated intrastate activities.5 4 To combat this trend, the Court
adopted a direct-indirect test in A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v. United
States,55 which involved a federal law intended to regulate the hours
and wages of slaughterhouse workers.56 The Court held that the
granted monopoly assigned to Ogden must yield to the federal license issued to Gibbons. Id. at 210.
JusticeJohnson filed a concurring opinion, expressing his view that the Constitution must be interpreted and executed as the Founders intended. Id. at 223 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson believed that commerce was an "exchange of
goods" that included the means of getting those goods to market. Id. at 229-30 (Johnson, J., concurring). Hence, Justice Johnson defined commerce broadly. Id. Concluding, Justice Johnson believed that if the federal power did not extend to the
regulation of shipping and navigation, it would lack the power to regulate interstate
commerce. Id. at 230.
54 See GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 99-116 (detailing the beginnings of Congress's
economic regulations premised on its Commerce Clause power). See generally Stafford
v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (upholding congressional regulation of meat-packing
industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (overruling child-labor laws
regulating local manufacturers); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding ban on transportation of prostitutes across state lines); Swift v. United States, 196
U.S. 375 (1905) (upholding Congress's application of the Sherman Act, supra note
21, on meatpackers); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding
manufacturing regulations unconstitutional).
The significance of the Stafford decision concerns the Court's "stream of commerce" or "flow of commerce" analysis. See Stafford, 258 U.S. at 516. ChiefJustice Taft
explained that the nation's stockyards are not designed to be a final destination. Id.
at 515. Rather, the Chief Justice noted, they are but "a throat through which the
current flows." Id. at 516. The Court concluded that because the stockyards were an
essential element in the interstate business of distribution of beef, Congress could
constitutionally regulate such practices deemed necessary within stockyards. Id. at
515-16, 528. Furthermore, the Court in Swift found that although the restraint on
trade and potential monopoly of such trade would be confined in a single state, the
effect on interstate commerce is- certain. Swift, 196 U.S. at 396-97; see also Friendly,
supra note 1, at 1023 (noting the growth of a stunning array of federal statutes
designed to remedy economic and social harms showing no signs of abatement).
55 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
56 Id. at 524. Defendant, A.LA. Schechter Corporation, was prosecuted for violation of the Live Poultry Code, which was incorporated into section three of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-713 (1977). Id. at 521. The
corporation purchased its live poultry either in New York City, at the West Washington Market, or at railroad stations serving New York. Id. at 520. Occasionally, defendant would purchase poultry from Philadelphia. Id. Upon purchasing the poultry,
defendant sold it to retail stores and butcher shops, which in turn sold the poultry
directly to consumers. Id. at 521. The Court made special mention that defendant
sold no poultry interstate. Id.
Defendant argued that its operations were intrastate and that the Live Poultry
Code was beyond Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 519. The Government
contended that unfair labor practices affected both the quality and supply of poultry
involved in interstate commerce and, thus, Congress had the right to regulate those
activities that lead to the unfair practices. Id. at 509; see also Robert L. Stem, The
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law was an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause
power, reasoning that because the corporation made no interstate
The
sales, Congress's power could not reach its activities.
Schechter Court stated that the standard used to determine the extent of Congress's Commerce Clause power was whether the trans58
actions of the defendant directly affected interstate commerce.
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, stated that such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, and although
the line between direct and indirect effects might not be obvious,
the distinction between the two is clear in principle.5 9
One year later, the Court seized the opportunity to broaden
the Schechter holding by deciding, in National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,6" that the Commerce Clause power
could reach intrastate manufacturing. 6 ' In Jones & Laughlin Steel,
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645, 660-64
(1946) (describing the litigation strategy for the Government regarding Schechter).
57 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 550. The Court rejected the proposition that the poultry
was in the "flow" or "current" of interstate commerce. Id. at 543. The Schechter Court,
in reaching this conclusion, determined that the mere fact there exists a "current" of
commodities flowing into a state does not imply that such a flow necessarily continues
out of the state. Id.
58 Id. at 546. The direct-indirect test formed in Schechter attempted to limit the
scope of the Commerce Clause power. See id. The Court warned that if the federal
powers could reach all activities that indirectly affected interstate commerce, such
powers would consume every part of human life, to the point that any state authority
would have to be implemented by permission of the federal government. Id.
The Court held that the scope of the Commerce Clause power in relation to
intrastate regulation must be defined by drawing a precise line between those activities directly affecting interstate commerce and those with only an indirect effect. Id.
The states retain the power to regulate those activities indirectly affecting interstate
commerce. Id.
59 Id. Chief Justice Hughes stated that the distinction between indirect and direct
effects must be viewed as fundamental. Id. at 548. Without this distinction, according
to Chief Justice Hughes, the constitutional system would be jeopardized. Id. The
Court cited the Shreveport Rate Case as an illustrative direct effects case. Id. at 544. In
that case, the Supreme Court upheld Congress's authority to regulate the cost of a
ticket. Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 360. The Court indicated that the commerce
of those cities on the interstate line were being substantially affected because the cost
of the intrastate-operated railroad was substantially lower than the railroad line operating interstate. Id. at 346-47. Chief Justice Hughes stated that Congress retains the
right to regulate common carriers' intrastate activities because common carriers have
a "close and substantial relation to interstate traffic and that the control is essential
• . . to secure the freedom of that traffic from interference or unjust discrimination
and to promote the efficiency of the interstate service." Schechter, 295 U.S. at 544.
60 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal by the Government from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 22. The
lower court ruled that the specific act in question was a violation of Congress's Commerce Clause powers, as applied to the corporation's activities regarding its own employees. Id.
61 Id. at 43.
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the Court considered whether Congress could enjoin a corporation, with multistate operations, from firing labor union employees. 6 2 Respondent, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,
challenged the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 on the
ground that its aim was to regulate labor, not interstate
63
commerce.

Chief Justice Hughes, again writing for the Court, concluded
that the Federal Commerce Clause power could be extended to a
corporation's labor relations activities because they normally substantially affect interstate commerce.6 4 The Court noted that the
65
corporation operated concurrently in a large number of states
and any work stoppage occurring because of "unfair labor practices" at its manufacturing plant would have major consequences
relating to interstate commerce.
Just five years after Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court granted
Congress further latitude to regulate intrastate activities in United
States v. Darby.66 The Court in Darby upheld a congressional law
that set maximum hours and minimum wages for employees en62 Id. at 22. The specific act in question was the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1971). Id.; see also Friendly, supra note 1, at 1023 (emphasizing the change in national labor relations after passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935). The government's argument stressed that the Act was prima facie
constitutional and that the Court need only consider whether the Act was constitutionally applied to respondent. Jones &Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 8. The Government
distinguished both Schechter and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 315 (1936),
finding both inapposite to the present case. Id. at 11. The Government argued that,
unlike Schechter and Carter,the statute dealt with issues closely connected to interstate
commerce and that the statute was narrowly tailored to regulate no more than was
necessary to protect commerce. Id.
63 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 12. Respondent argued that the statute was a
regulation of labor because the case involved 10 individuals who filed suit as a result
of their dismissal for their involvement in a labor union. Id. In the alternative, respondent asserted that even if a Commerce Clause issue was present, the Court
should take caution because, if upheld, there would be uncertainty as to the limits of
the Commerce Clause power. Id. at 19. Respondent further argued that such broad
power could "stifle the sovereignty of the States." Id. Moreover, respondent argued
that any interstate consequences occurring because of a strike at its manufacturing
plant would be both unforeseeable and independent intervening acts, thus excusing
respondent from liability. Id. at 18.
64 Id. at 41. Chief Justice Hughes explained that "the term 'affecting commerce'
means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce." Id. at 31.
65 See id. at 27. Respondent employed approximately 533,000 persons and conducted operations in nearly every state. Id. at 26-27. The Court noted that respondent shipped about 75% of his product out of Pennsylvania. Id. at 27.
66 312 U.S. 100 (1941). This case arrived at the Supreme Court on appeal by the
Government from a lower court's quashing of the governmental indictment that
charged Darby with violating a federal law which regulated hours and wages of em-

912

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:897

gaged in the production or manufacture of goods to be used in
interstate commerce.6 7 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Stone upheld the federal law.6" The Darby Court reasoned that
while production and manufacturing activities are not in themselves interstate commerce, the shipment and movement of goods
resulting from these activities do involve interstate commerce. 69
Therefore, the Court concluded, a federal law regulating such production and manufacturing activities is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 7' Further, Justice Stone officially
announced that the Tenth Amendment no longer represented a
limitation of federal power under the Commerce Clause. 1
ployees. Id. at 111; see Leboeuf, supra note 20, at 585-86 (discussing federal intervention in the field of labor law).
67 Darby, 312 U.S. at 109. The particular legislation at issue was the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1971). Id. (citation omitted). The Act
prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of all goods produced or manufactured in the United States under conditions that failed to conform to the standards
set forth in the Act. Id. Appellee, Darby, owned a lumber factory in Georgia and was
charged with failing to comply with the provisions of the Act. Greenspan, supra note
16, at 1029.
The Government's argument centered around the inability of the states to regulate the evil of long hours and poor wages that the Government believed to be infecting the industrial markets. Darby, 312 U.S. at 102. Moreover, the Government
believed that even if such control could be obtained within the particular state, "it
could not safeguard them against the loss of their markets in other States." Id. Thus,
the federal government, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, is empowered to cope
with such problems. Id. The argument supporting such intervention is founded on
the incorrect notion that the states are not capable of creating redistributive legislation to counterbalance the unwanted results of supposedly beneficial legislation. Leboeuf, supra note 20, at 585.
Appellee, Darby, conceded that the federal government may prohibit the interstate shipments of baneful and pernicious goods. Darby, 312 U.S. at 105; see, e.g.,
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1911) (banning the sale of eggs
whose labels failed to conform to a federal enactment). Darby argued that there was
a material difference between the manufacture and production of harmful goods
and, as in its case, the manufacture and production of useful goods. Darby, 312 U.S. at
105. Further, Darby, citing the Schechter case, contended that the law was merely an
indirect attack on the state's power to regulate pursuant to the Constitution. Id. at
107 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 549 (1935)).
68 Darby, 312 U.S. at 125.
69

Id. at 113.

Darby, 312 U.S. at 117. The Darby Court expanded Congress's power to regulate
intrastate commerce by expressly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918). Id. at 116-17.
71 Id. at 113. The Court expressed two justifications for sustaining the Act. Greenspan, supra note 16, at 1030. First, noted the Court, Congress may regulate any good
traveling through interstate commerce by any reasonable means. Id. (citing Darby,
312 U.S. at 121). Second, the Court believed that goods manufactured under nonconforming conditions act as a detriment to the interstate sales of goods manufactured in compliance with the Act. Id. (citing Darby, 312 U.S. at 122).
70
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The following year, the Supreme Court rendered its most radical decision to date involving a Commerce Clause issue. 7 In Wickard v. Filburn, a local farmer violated a federal act that restricted
the production of wheat in excess of a mandated allotment.7" The
parties maintained opposing views concerning the power of Congress to control the quantity of wheat an individual could
produce.4
In reversing the district court's ruling, which had adopted
Wickard's position, the Court replaced the traditional tests concerning interstate Commerce Clause issues with a "cumulative-effects" theory.7 5 Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson explained
that the federal act could properly reach a single individual acting
solely intrastate. 76 The Court acknowledged that while one individual's acts alone would have a de minimis effect on interstate commerce, the combination of a group of persons, each acting alone,
would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.7 7
72 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). This case came to the Supreme
Court on appeal by the Government from the United States District Court for the
District of Ohio, which had ruled that the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1989), could not be applied to the appellee. Id. at 116-17. The
purpose of the Act was to control the amount of wheat moving in interstate commerce. Id. at 115.
73 Id. at 114-15. Specifically, Wickard owned a farm in Ohio where, among other
activities, Wickard grew and harvested wheat. Id. at 114. With knowledge of the allotment established for him under the Act, Wickard harvested more than the allotment
and was fined for doing so. Id. at 114-15.
74 Id. at 113-14, 119-20. Wickard argued that the Act was a regulation of both
production and consumption of wheat and therefore went beyond the reach of the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 119. The Government argued that the Act's purpose was to
control the abnormally high and low prices for wheat resulting from excessive surpluses and shortages. Id. The Government argued further that the Act regulated
marketing and was constitutional as a "necessary and proper" regulation of interstate
commerce. Id.
75 Id. at 122-23, 124 (noting the use of such terms as "direct," "substantial," and
"material" have ceased to be used in Commerce Clause issues). The Court reasoned
that the traditional tests once used were no longer feasible due to the change in the
economy. Id. at 123-24. The Court proclaimed that once Congress's power to regulate an economic activity is recognized, questions of that power cannot be reconciled
by the labeling of certain activities as "production" or their effects as "indirect." Id. at
124. Commerce among the states, noted the Court, is a practical conception created
from the course of business, not a technical conception drawn from the law. Id. at
122 (quoting Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905)). Although the Court
did not expressly state a "cumulative-effects" test or theory, the dictum of the Court
led to the formation of such a label. See generally TRIBE, supra note 2, § 5.5, at 310-11.
76 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
77 Id. at 127-28. The Court noted that while "appellee's own contribution to the
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself it is not enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that
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In Katzenbach v. McClung,78 the Court implemented the "cumulative-effects" theory set forth in Wickard while officially adopting the rational basis test alluded to in Darby to extend the
Commerce Clause power to Civil Rights issues. 79 More specifically,
the Court considered whether Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
196480 could be applied to a local restaurant.8" Reversing the district court's decision, Justice Clark, expressing the opinion of the
Court, reviewed the Act and applied Wickards "cumulative effects"
theory to the restaurant because the majority of food served in the
restaurant had moved through interstate commerce. 2 Further,
Justice Clark noted that the fact that Congress had made no formal
findings was irrelevant because there was a rational basis for choosing such a regulatory scheme to protect commerce.8 3
of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id. (citing United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941)).
78 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
79 Id. at 300-01, 303-04.
80 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a6 (1989).
81 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 295. The restaurant purchased 46% of its food from a
supplier who had purchased the meat from outside the state. Id. at 296. Thus, the
district court found that a significant percentage of food sold in the restaurant was a
product of interstate commerce. Id. at 296-97.
82 Id. at 304-05. The Court stated that African-Americans would be less likely to
travel, knowing that food could not be purchased easily, and such lack of travel substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at 300. The Court stipulated that the matter could not be settled based on the Fourteenth Amendment because the State was
not encouraging the discrimination of African-Americans. Id. at 297.
83 Id. at 303, 304. The Court expressed that once it is established that Congress
has a rational basis for its regulation, the Court's investigation is at an end. Id. at 304.
Thus, noted the Court, it need only make one other inquiry: whether the restaurant
offers to serve or serves interstate customers or if it sells or serves meat that has traveled through interstate commerce. Id. Finding the answer to this inquiry in the affirmative, the Court declared the Act valid. Id. at 305.
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Katzenbach, the Court handed down
a decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) [hereinafter
Heartof Atlanta]. Id. at 295. Like Katzenbach, Heartof Atlanta also dealt with Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 242-43. See also GUNTHER,
supra note 4, at 151-56 (synthesizing the Supreme Court's decisions in Katzenbach and
Heart of Atlanta). In Heart of Atlanta, the Court issued a declaratory judgment stating
that Congress could constitutionally prohibit racial discrimination occurring in motels servicing either interstate or intrastate travelers. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250.
The Court reasoned that African-Americans would be less likely to travel knowing that
accommodations were not available and such restraint would then affect commerce
between the states. Id. at 252-53. The Court further noted that the determinative test
when dealing with a Commerce Clause issue is whether the activity sought to be regulated concerns more than one state: if so, it may be regulated. Id. at 255.
Both opinions in Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach contain references to Congress's
hearings concerning the Act. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299. Each opinion noted further that although no formal findings were made, the congressional record was replete with evidence that the actions sought to be regulated affected interstate
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The Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. WirtzS 4 further
expanded Congress's Commerce Clause power by holding congressional legislation applicable to such state-run institutions as schools
and hospitals.8 5 The Witz holding demonstrated the extent to
which the Court viewed Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause to be superior to the states' powers under the Tenth
Amendment. 6 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, acknowledged that the Commerce Clause power has limits.8 7 The Court,
however, held that cases involving the Commerce Clause would
commerce. Id.; see also GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 151 n.5 (quoting Senator Cooper,
who argued that such discrimination should be handled under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that by using a Commerce Clause analysis, Congress was placing the
rights of African-Americans on less important grounds).
84 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
85 Id. at 200-01.
86 Id. at 198-99. The particular act at issue in Wirtz was, as in United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109 (1941), the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Id. at 185-86.
In 1961, Congress amended the Act to include in its provisions any employee of any
"enterprise" dealing in the production of commerce. Id. at 186. In 1966, Congress
again amended the Act by adding hospitals and schools to the list of "enterprises"
involved in interstate commerce. Id. at 186-87. The challenges to the amendments
contended that the expansion of coverage by using the term "enterprise" was beyond
the scope of the Commerce Clause power, that state-run hospitals and schools were
also beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause power, and such institutions were not
involved with interstate commerce. Id. at 187. The appellants in Wirtz were the State
of Maryland and 27 other states who had subsequently joined the lawsuit. Id.
The Court affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the amendments to the Act were permissible. Id. at 188. Relying on Darby, Katzenbach, and Wickard, the Court concluded that the issues raised by appellants were previously settled.
Id. at 188, 190-91, 192-93. First, noted the Court, Darby established that Congress may
regulate a class of activities-manufacturing-that it finds affecting interstate commerce. Id. at 192. Second, the Court opined that Katzenbach enabled Congress to
regulate activities affecting interstate commerce if it had a rational reason to do so.
Id. at 190. Finally, the Court referred to the decision in Wickard as establishing that
the Court may not trivialize individual instances because they occur purely intrastate.
Id. at 192-93.
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion with Justice Stewart concurring, denouncing the decision of the majority because it ignored the implications of the
Tenth Amendment. Id. at 201 (Douglas, J.,dissenting). Justice Douglas distinguished
several cases which held the states subject to federal regulation, stating that in none of
those cases did the regulation conflict with state fiscal policy. Id. at 203 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas specifically questioned the extent to which the Commerce Clause power could be extended under the majority's reasoning. Id. at 204-05
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Concluding, Justice Douglas declared that "[t]he Court
must draw the 'constitutional line between the State as government and the State as
trader[.]"' Id. at 205 (DouglasJ., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
87 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196. Justice Harlan addressed the concern that Congress
could declare an entire state an "enterprise" affecting interstate commerce, thus obtaining power over the entire state. Id. at 196 n.27. The Justice noted, however, that
the Court has sufficient power to prevent such utter destruction of state sovereignty.
Id. at 196.
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continue to be decided on the basis of whether Congress had a
rational reason for regulating the particular activity.8 8 According
to Justice Harlan, this held true whether or not the activity at issue
is run by the state with the purpose of benefiting its own citizens.8 9
Moreover, Justice Harlan proclaimed, when a class of activities is
being regulated by Congress, the Court need not consider whether
a particular defendant individually affected interstate commerce.9"
The Justice concluded that if the class being regulated affects interstate commerce, any individual doing that act has affected it as
well. 9 1
In Perez v. United States,9" the Court supported Congress's use
of its Commerce Clause power to enact legislation regulating criminal activity previously left to the states.9" The district court convicted Perez of violating a federal law prohibiting the practice of
loansharking,9 4 and on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the
88 Id. at 190 (quoting Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04). The Court concluded that
Congress clearly had a rational basis to regulate schools and hospitals. Id. Among the
reasons given by the Court was the fact that strikes and work stoppages at such institutions as schools and hospitals undoubtedly affect the flow of goods crossing state lines.
Id. at 195.
89 Id. at 198-99. In reaching this determination, Justice Harlan discussed United
States v. California,297 U.S. 175 (1935). Id. at 197. In United States v. California, the
Court addressed whether a state-run railroad, operated entirely intrastate, was subject
to a federal law. United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 180. The Court, concluding
that the railroad was subject to the Act, stated that the railroad involved interstate
commerce and, hence, was subject to federal regulation. Id. at 184. The Court conceded that the railroad was operated by the State as an exercise of state sovereignty,
but held that such sovereignty must yield to the powers of the federal government. Id.
at 184-85. Moreover, the Wirtz Court announced that a state has no more power to
deny a valid exercise of federal power than an individual. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 199.
90 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 192-93.
91 Id. at 193.
92 402 U.S. 146 (1971). This case was brought to the Supreme Court on appeal
after the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Id. at 147.
93 Id. at 156-57. Armed with such broad leeway, Congress began to increase its
regulation of criminal activity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers. See Chippendale, supra note 23, at 455. Over the past 20 years, Congress has redefined federal law
enforcement by enacting mandatory sentencing statutes, sentencing schemes, and
criminal statutes virtually identical to state codes. Id. at 461-62.
94 "Loansharking" is the "[p] ractice of lending money at excessive and usurious
interest rates, with the threat or employment of extortionate means to enforce repayment of the loan. Such activities are termed 'extortionate credit transactions' under
the Federal Criminal Code." BLAcx's LAw DIcrioNARv 648 (6th ed. 1991).
Defendant loaned $1000 to an individual, Miranda, who agreed to repay the loan
over 14 weeks at $105 a week. Perez, 402 U.S. at 147-148. After six or eight weeks,
defendant increased the amount of weekly payments to $330. Id. at 148. When it
appeared that the weekly payments could not be met, defendant threatened Miranda
with violence. Id. Subsequently, defendant was arrested and charged with violating a
federal act. Id. Defendant challenged only the constitutionality of the two "loan
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conviction.9 5 The Court stated that a crime involving loansharking
contributed significantly to the deterioration of interstate
commerce.

96

The Court, in an opinion byJustice Douglas, upheld the criminal statute's constitutionality in this particular case because loansharking dealt directly with money, and because organized crime is
a national problem.9 7 Borrowing the concepts of Darby, Wickard,
and Wirtz, Justice Douglas concluded that the defendant's convicshark" amendments attached to the Act. Id. at 149. The Court noted that the amendments were met with criticism by certain individuals who claimed that the amendments, if adopted, would take a substantial step toward a general federal police power.
Id. The Court further maintained that Congress took no heed of this criticism and
subsequently adopted the amendments. Id. at 155.
95 Perez, 402 U.S. at 157.
96 Id. The Court, in reaching its decision, looked to the congressional records,
which indicated that loansharking was the second highest source of income for organized crime operations. Id. at 155. The Court noted that organized crime netted
roughly $350 million yearly. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Douglas began the Court's analysis with the principles outlined in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), stating that the Supreme Court decisions
after Gibbons were not in accord with those principles. Id. at 150-51. The Court continued, stating that the decisions in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and
Wickard v. Filburn, 102 U.S. 111 (1942), had restored the broad Commerce Clause
view expressed by ChiefJustice Marshall in Gibbons. Id. at 151. Justice Douglas made
special note of Darby because it dealt with criminal charges. Id. at 152-53. Moreover,
the Court noted that the rule set forth in Darby, with regard to regulating a class, was
applied in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Id. at 153-54. Building on this, Justice Douglas
cited Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), for the proposition that once this class
of activities is determined to be within congressional reach, the Court may not trivialize the actions of an individual of the class. Id. at 154.
With the foundation laid, Justice Douglas narrowed the Court's discussion to an
analogous case, Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927). Id. In Westfal4 an
employee at a state bank, in affiliation with the Federal Reserve System, created a
fraudulent deposit and paid it with bank funds. Westfal4 274 U.S. at 257. The employee in Westfall was charged with violating a federal act. WestfalL Id. at 258. Westfall
argued that the act was not applicable because the Federal Reserve System was unaffected by his actions. Id. Justice Douglas noted that the Court in Westfall proclaimed,
"'[blut every fraud like the one before us weakens the member bank and therefore
weakens the System."' Perez, 402 U.S. at 155 (quoting Westfall 274 U.S. at 259). The
Court in Perez used this line of thinking to conclude that there existed a nexus between loansharking and interstate commerce. Id.
Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in Perez and attacked the majority's finding that the crime of loansharking had distinguishable characteristics from any other
crime in relation to interstate commerce. Id. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart suggested that the majority must go further than merely stating that such a
crime is a national problem that affects interstate business. Id. Justice Stewart offered
the proposition that all crime presents a national problem, and all crime affects interstate business. Id. Justice Stewart stated that he could not detect any rational difference between loansharking and other crimes occurring in the local arena. Id. at 158
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
97 Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
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tion affected interstate commerce even though it occurred within a
state.98 The Perez decision was followed by several additional
United States Supreme Court cases that further evidenced the
Court's lack of clarity regarding the scope of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause. 99
The recent case of United States v. Lopez1 °° reflects the current
Court's perspective in the area of federalism and its five-to-four decision"10 offers insight to the varying points of view of the present
98 Id. at 151-53.
99 See Field, supranote 22, at 86-87. First, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the
Court struck down a federal law imposing minimum wage and overtime rules on state
employees. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976). The majority concluded that the law impaired the states' ability to function effectively within the
federal system. Id. at 851-52; see also Field, supra note 22, at 86 (noting that the Court
based its decision in NationalLeague on the express constitutional prohibition of the
federal powers). The Court articulated two reasons for its holding: first, the Court
indicated that the cost of compliance was excessively high, NationalLeague, 426 U.S. at
846, and second, that the law infringed upon the states' abilities to spend their
money. National League, 426 U.S. at 845, 849; see Friendly, supra note 1, at 1031-33
(labeling National League as a "thunderclap" regarding the state-federal relationship
and warning that National League is not the end of the Court's inquiry into the Commerce Clause).
Despite the apparent narrowing of the Commerce Clause powers in National
League, the Court decided differently nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1625
(detailing the background, insight, and reasoning of the Garcia decision). In another
five-to-four vote, with Justice Blackmun changing his vote, the GarciaCourt overruled
National League. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557. For a discussion of Justice Blackmun's
changed vote, see Richard S. Myers, The Burger Court and the Commerce Clause: An Evaluation of the Role of State Sovereignty, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1056, 1067-68 (1985).
Once again, the issue involved the minimum wage and overtime provisions set
forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to a mass transit system owned and
operated by a municipality. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 533. The Court, finding such provisions applicable, concluded that a transit system was not a "traditional governmental
function." Id. at 546-47. The majority in Garciainsisted that the Commerce Clause
power has limits and that state sovereignty was protected by certain procedural safeguards provided for in the Constitution. Id. at 556. See generally Field, supra note 22,
at 88 (expressing the Court's opinion that the Constitution dictates that federal powers must be placed before state powers).
In dissent, Justice Powell expressed the view that the Tenth Amendment was created for a reason and that the majority had ignored its purpose and had merely paid
"lipservice to the role of the States." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 574 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell referred to the concept of democracy in stating that such institutions
are created and run by the states' citizens and are better off being left to the states to
control. Id. at 576-77 (Powell,J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist, also dissenting,
forewarned that the principles set forth in National League would again dictate the
support of the majority. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
101 Id. at 1625. The majority was comprised of ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring
opinion, in which Justice O'Connor joined. Id.; see generally infra notes 135-38 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion). Justice
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Court's membership." 2 The Lopez Court held that the mere possession of a firearm did not substantially affect interstate commerce
and, consequently, that the application of a federal statute to make
such possession a crime was beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause power.103 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
began the Court's analysis by reiterating the early principles of federalism." 4 Building on these principles, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that the delegation to Congress of the power to regulate
commerce stemmed from the Constitution itself.1 5 The majority
noted, initially, that a common finding by the Court in the early
Commerce Clause cases concerned the express limitations
on the
10 6
power of Congress to regulate pursuant to the clause.
The Chief Justice's analysis continued, noting Congress's expansion of federal regulation in the areas of interstate commerce
and antitrust.0 7 ChiefJustice Rehnquist emphasized, however, the
Court's reluctance to expand Congress's Commerce Clause powers.10 8 The Chief Justice then noted the Supreme Court's change
in view regarding Commerce Clause jurisprudence.10 9 While acThomas also filed a concurring opinion. Id. See generally infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's concurring opinion). Justice Stevens
wrote a dissenting opinion. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1625; see generally infra notes 149-52
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion). Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1625; see generally infra notes 153-61
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's dissenting opinion). Justice
Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1625; see generally infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion).
102 See generally Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the Old Order in the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 1995, at 1, 4 (analyzing the factions of the current Court); Richard Lacayo, The
Soul of a New Majority, TIME,July 10, 1995, at 46 (claiming thatJustices O'Connor and
Kennedy are "the swing votes" of the Lopez decision).
103 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626, 1634. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that even where
gun possession occurs more than once, the effect on interstate commerce would remain insubstantial. Id. at 1634.
104 Id. at 1626. The Court enunciated the need for a healthy balance of power
between federal and state governments to diminish the threat of "tyranny and abuse
from either front." Id.
105 Id. (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). See supra note 20 (defining the Commerce Clause).
106 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
107 Id. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to the Interstate Commerce
Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the
amount of federal regulation pursuant to these Acts was numerous enough to be
considered a new era in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Id.
108 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that the Court rejected federal legislation because it did not directly affect interstate commerce. Id. (citing A.L.A. Schechter Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935)). Similarly, the Court further noted a distinction between commerce and other activities, such as mining. Id.
109 Id. at 1628 (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
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knowledging that the change permitted regulation of many activities, both of a national and local nature, the majority emphasized
that prior decisions cautioned Congress that its powers under the
Commerce Clause were not unlimited. 110
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the three broad categories under which Congress is permitted to regulate: channels of
interstate commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.1 1 1 The
majority noted that prior Supreme Court decisions were vague in
determining whether an activity needed to "substantially affect" or
merely "affect" interstate commerce. 11 2 In attempting to clarify
this ambiguity, the Chief Justice declared acceptable legislation to
be that which endeavors to regulate economic activity substantially
affecting interstate commerce." 3 Moreover, the Court proclaimed, in order to sustain § 9 22(q), the statute must fall within
Congress's ability to regulate such substantially-affecting activities. 14 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that § 9 22(q) was nothing more than a criminal statute, lacking any economic substance
whatsoever.1 15
301 U.S. 1, 36-38 (1936)). Chief Justice Rehnquist labeled Jones & Laughlin Steel as
the "watershed" case. Id. The Court recognized that Jones & Laughlin Steel was the
first case to abandon the distinction between what was a "direct" effect upon interstate
commerce and what was "indirect." Id. Instead, noted Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel declared any activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce to be subject to federal regulation. Id. (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301
U.S. at 37). ChiefJustice Rehnquist attributed the Court's change in view to the realization that the United States had changed greatly in the economic and business
spheres. Id.
110 Id. at 1628-29 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37). Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that later Supreme Court decisions heeded these early warnings by
imposing the rational basis test to Commerce Clause issues. Id.
"M Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (citing United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 150
(1971)). The Court, in identifying the channels of interstate commerce, cited Darby,
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). Id. at 1629. The Court noted that "'[t]he authority of
Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question."' Id.
(quoting Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491). Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that Congress's power to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce may extend to
intrastate affairs. Id.
112 Id. at 1630.
113 Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to past Supreme Court decisions upholding federal regulation of such activities found to substantially affect interstate commerce. Id.
114 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist tersely disposed of the contention that § 9 22(q) is
either a regulation of a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce. Id.
115 Id. at 1630-31. The Court further noted that § 922(q) did not contain ajurisdictional component that would ensure that a particular firearm possession in some way
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Noting that § 9 22(q) contains no economic fabric, the majority admitted that legislative findings, expressing the intent of Congress in creating a law, may be used by the Court to determine its
validity.1 16 Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that no such findings
were present in the passage of § 9 22(q). 1 7 The Court further rejected the Government's claim that Congress had acquired expertise in regulating firearm possession through past legislation,
stating that § 9 2 2 (q) entered ground never before regulated by
prior enactments. 1 8 Continuing, Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that if the Court were to sustain § 9 22(q), it would be difficult to recognize any limitation on the Commerce Clause power.' 1 9
Next, the majority addressed Justice Breyer's dissenting opin120
ion.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist remarked that the principal dissent
12
failed to enunciate any activity that only the states may regulate. 1
affected interstate commerce. Id. at 1631. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained this
through a discussion of United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). Id. In Bass, noted
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Court struck down a federal law criminalizing the possession, receipt, or transportation of a firearm by any felon. Id. (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at
339), Chief Justice Rehnquist, explaining the Bass decision, stated that the Government failed to show a sufficient nexus between gun possession and interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. In May of 1995, President Clinton submitted to
Congress a proposed Gun-Free School Zones Amendment Act of 1995. 141 CONG.
REc. H4680 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of President Clinton); 141 CONG.
REc. S6459 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of President Clinton). This Act, suggested the President, would establish the requisite nexus to obtain a conviction under
the Act. Id.
116 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Court clarified that such findings are not essential. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964)). Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained, however, that such findings are beneficial to the Court when
evaluating the judgment of the legislature. Id. at 1632.
117 Id. at 1632.
118 Id. (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (claiming that when Congress has legislated continually in an area of national
interest, it gains experience that may decrease the need for further hearings or extended debate when Congress considers future action in that area)). For a detailed
history of federal firearm legislation, see Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348-60; see also Giller, supra
note 16, at 164-76 (discussing the various gun possession laws imposed by Congress).
119 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The Government defended § 9 22(q) on the ground
that the overall cost of crime is a national problem because of its effect on insurance.
Id. The Government also claimed that violent crime prevents people from moving
through interstate commerce to areas known to be troubled with such crimes. Id.
Moreover, the Government believed that gun possession in and around schools has
an adverse affect on education, thus affecting interstate commerce. Id. ChiefJustice
Rehnquist warned that if § 922(q) were upheld, Congress could use similar reasoning
to regulate such things as curriculum. Id. at 1633; see also Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367 (warning that the progeny of § 922(q) would lead to the possible regulation of "lead pencils, 'sneakers,' Game Boys or slide rules").
120 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
121 Id. Although Justice Breyer conceded that the Commerce Clause could have
limitations in areas of education and family law, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave no
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Using the dissent's theory to illustrate this point, the majority
noted that such legislation would enable Congress to dictate the
curriculum taught in local schools because the education of children substantially affects commerce. 12 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist
criticized Justice Breyer's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, stating that Justice Breyer's analysis acknowledges no limitations on the Commerce Clause where precedent specifically states
123
otherwise.
Concluding, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the possession
of a firearm within a local school zone cannot be viewed as an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, even if repeated
elsewhere.1 24 The majority stated that if it agreed with the Government's position, Congress would obtain authority that was reserved
to the states under the Constitution.1 25 Finally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist proclaimed that the Court's holding, although sounding
12 6
broad, should be viewed as limited in scope.
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O'Connor, emphasized that the holding of the Court was
necessary, yet limited.12 7 By synthesizing the history of the Coincredence to such suggested limitations. Id. at 1633. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that under the principal dissent's expansive analysis, these suggested limitations are
"devoid of substance." Id. at 1632.
122 Id. at 1633.
123 Id. at 1633. ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that the Constitution demands some
degree of uncertainty by withholding a general police power from the federal government. Id. Continuing, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that any attempt to try to
alleviate this uncertainty would conflict with the system of enumerated powers mandated by the Constitution. Id.
The Court, in rejecting Justice Breyer's analysis, proclaimed that any activity
could be generalized to affect interstate commerce. Id. Specifically, Chief Justice
Rehnquist illustrated the rationale used by the dissent with the example of child rearing. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress could declare child rearing a
commercial activity because it provides children with requisite skills needed to compete in both the workplace and in life. Id. Thus, according to the majority, Congress
could regulate how a person raises his or her child. Id. Concluding the point, the
Court indicated that although Congress has the right to regulate commercial activity,
that right does not include every aspect of the commercial activity and, more specifically, not every aspect of local schools. Id.
124 Id. at 1634. The Court further noted that § 922(q) also failed to allege any
nexus between interstate commerce and firearm possession. Id.
125 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that prior
Supreme Court decisions have granted Congress great deference in converting the
Commerce Clause into a federal police power. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted,
however, that to sustain § 9 22(q), the Court would have to "pile inference upon inference," which in turn would give Congress power that, according to the Constitution,
resides in the states. Id.
126 Id.
127 Lopez 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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merce Clause decisions, Justice Kennedy depicted an ever-dynamic
Court.1 28 Justice Kennedy continued by indicating the inconsisteninterpretacies of past Supreme Court decisions and the various
129
tions the Court utilized in reaching those decisions.
Justice Kennedy suggested that there are two lessons that can
be drawn from Commerce Clause jurisprudence.1 30 The first, announced Justice Kennedy, is the overall ineffectiveness of subject
matter distinctions when analyzing the constitutionality of a particular statute, and the second is the overall need for consistency in
128 Id. at 1634-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Beginning the synthesis, Justice Kennedy recalled the principles set forth in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), which stated that the Commerce Clause power extends to commerce involving more than one state; is complete in itself; may be utilized to its maximum potential; and is only limited by express constitutional provisions. Id. at 1634 (quoting
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194, 196). Justice Kennedy remarked that the majority
of cases following Gibbons that dealt with Commerce Clause issues called for a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 1634-35; see generally Steven Breker-Cooper,
The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 69 OR. L. REv. 895, 935
(1990) (arguing that the judiciary should not interfere with the regulation of states'
commercial enactments until Congress has first acted).
Justice Kennedy explained that one approach used by the Court in the early
Commerce Clause cases was to determine the validity of state action based on the
subject matter or content of the regulated activity. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1635 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Further explaining this approach, Justice Kennedy examined the distinction between commerce and manufacturing. Id. Justice Kennedy indicated that
this distinction became increasingly prevalent as a means of countering the rapid
growth of industrial development in the United States. Id. (citing United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895)).
Next, Justice Kennedy discussed the Supreme Court decisions involving Congress's ability to regulate and prohibit the interstate movement of harmful goods. Id.
Justice Kennedy further noted that the Supreme Court has upheld Congress's power
to prohibit as well as to regulate. Id. (citing Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64
(1903)). Justice Kennedy then offered Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918),
to express the Court's change of view with regard to manufacturing and commerce.
Id. at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Moreover, Justice Kennedy opined that the Court achieved a more practicable
approach in its application of the "substantially affects" standard. Id. Justice Kennedy, however, noted that the failure to apply the "substantially affects" test in all
Commerce Clause cases tainted this practical approach. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy,J., concurring). Concluding the synthesis, Justice Kennedy examined the modern Supreme
Court treatment of Commerce Clause issues. Id. Justice Kennedy indicated the more
recent decisions involving the Commerce Clause powers encompassed broader views
that supersede the earlier, narrower views. Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 112 (1942)).
129 Id. at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy suggested that there are
two lessons that can be drawn from the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Id. The first, announcedJustice Kennedy, is the overall ineffectiveness of subject matter distinctions when analyzing the constitutionality of a particular statute, and the
second is the overall need for consistency in such analysis. Id.
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such analysis.1 31 Justice Kennedy further noted that stare decisis 132
prevents the Court from applying an archaic, eighteenth-century
analysis to Commerce Clause issues. 133 According to Justice Kennedy, Congress has the authority to regulate any commercial activity because the United States has developed into a single market
coupled with a unified purpose to fashion a sound national
1 34

economy.

Justice Kennedy also recognized the concept of federalism, as
established by the Constitution, 135 and stressed the need for a
healthy balance between the federal and state governments.1 36 In
emphasizing such a need, Justice Kennedy suggested that § 922(q)
is unconstitutional as an excessive use of the Commerce Clause,
13 7
which upsets the balance between federal and state powers.
Id.
Stare decisis refers to the
[p] olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point.
Doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply
it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of
whether the parties and property are the same. . . . Under doctrine,
when point of law has been settled by decision, it forms precedent
which is not afterwards to be departed from, and, while it should ordinarily be strictly adhered to, there are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice. The doctrine is not ordinarily departed from
where decision is of long-standing and rights have been acquired under
it, unless considerations of public policy demand it.
BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 978-79 (6th ed. 1991).
133 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But see infra notes 139-48
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's argument that the Court's Commerce Clause Jurisprudence should return to its original intent). Justice Kennedy
further maintained that stare decisis prevented the Court from rejecting the ability of
Congress to regulate commercial activity on the basis that there was an insufficient
connection to interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
134 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 1637-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that the Constitution contains several elements that dictate the structure of the federal government:
judicial review, checks and balances, separation of powers, and federalism. Id. Justice Kennedy further noted that only federalism has resulted in judicial uncertainty.
Id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136 Id. Justice Kennedy proclaimed that the purpose of federalism is to "assign
political responsibility, not to obscure it." Id. Justice Kennedy warned that if the federal government was permitted to regulate areas generally considered to be left to the
states, the states' political responsibility would become blurred. Id.
137 Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that "the federal
balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role
in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level
of Government has tipped the scales too far." Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Thus, Justice Kennedy declared that because § 922(q) contained no commercial
131
132
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy asserted that the states are sufficiently
capable of handling the problems that § 922(q) sought to
138
remedy.

Writing a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
stressed the need for the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
to return to its original intent, as construed by the Framers of the
Constitution. 139 Justice Thomas noted that both the majority and

the principal dissent agreed that the federal government has no
police power." Justice Thomas further suggested that the Court
must reexamine the "substantially affects" test to reflect more
closely the intention of1 4the
Framers of the Constitution in drafting
1
the Commerce Clause.

Justice Thomas stated that the purpose of the concurring
opinion was to illustrate the Court's departure from the original
intent of the Commerce Clause.1 42 If the Constitution granted
nexus to interstate commerce and neither the actor nor his action affected interstate
commerce, the statute was unconstitutional as it interfered with a traditional state
concern. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
138 Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy observed that over 40
states have statutes criminalizing the possession of firearms on and around school
grounds. Id. Moreover, Justice Kennedy recognized that the local citizenry has more
expertise in how best to rid themselves of such problems as gun violence. Id. Concluding, Justice Kennedy believed § 9 22(q) to be unconstitutional as it prevents the
states from utilizing their own discretion in an area traditionally belonging to the
states. Id.
139 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (ThomasJ, concurring). Id. Justice Thomas suggested
that, in the future, the Court should qualify its Commerce Clause jurisprudence to
adhere to both past law and the original intent of the Founders. Id.
140 Id. Justice Thomas explained that the Court has always rejected readings of the
Commerce Clause that enabled Congress to exercise a general police power. Id.
Although the principal dissent acknowledged that the federal commerce power has
limits, Justice Thomas opined that the current "substantially affects" test enhances the
possibility that Congress would regulate activities generally considered to be left to
the states as an exercise of police powers. Id.
141 Id. at 1645 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas further noted that the
Court has, in prior decisions, afforded Congress more power and deference than was
constitutionally allocated. Id. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas indicated that commerce was initially considered to be analogous to trade. Id. at 1643
(Thomas, J, concurring). Justice Thomas declared, however, that commerce was also
used in contradistinction to certain activities, such as agriculture and manufacturing.
Id. Justice Thomas noted that agriculture and manufacturing deal with the production of goods, while commerce involves the traffic of such goods. Id. Justice Thomas
concluded that if the framers intended the Court to use a "substantially affects" test in
adjudicating Commerce Clause issues, the Constitution would have reflected such an
intention. Id. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Thomas proclaimed
that the majority's decision was in no way radical. Id. Justice Thomas lastly expressed
the need to reproduce a coherent test that would honor the distinction between the
federal and state governments. Id.
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Congress the power to regulate any activity that "substantially affects" commerce, stated Justice Thomas, then other enumerated
powers such as the authority to sanction counterfeiters or the
power to pass bankruptcy laws would have no meaning. 143 Hence,
Justice Thomas believed that the Framers intended the Commerce
Clause to reach only a limited amount of activities."4
Addressing Justice Breyer's dissent, Justice Thomas opined
that Justice Breyer had misread precedent, specifically the reasoning of Gibbons v. Ogden.145 Justice Thomas continued by reviewing
the early history of Commerce Clause decisions.' 46 While highlighting these past decisions, Justice Thomas noted the federal government's limited powers. 14 7 Turning to the specific statute at
issue, Justice Thomas then explained that upholding § 922(q)
143 Id. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas derived this reasoning
from an analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id.; see supra note 12. Justice
Thomas announced that if Congress retained a plenary power to regulate any activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce, there would have been no reason for
the Constitution to specify Congress's power to regulate trade with foreign nations
and Indians. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1646 (Thomas,J., concurring). Justice Thomas believed that the dissent's
misreading of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), resulted from two
statements made by Chief Justice Marshall. Id. at 1647 (Thomas, J., concurring).
First, noted Justice Thomas, the Gibbons decision declared that "the federal power
does not encompass 'commerce' that 'does not extend to other States."' Id. (quoting
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194). Justice Thomas concluded that the principal
dissent misinterpreted this statement to mean that when interstate commerce is affected by an activity, Congress retains the right to regulate that activity. Id.
The second statement of ChiefJustice Marshall that was misinterpreted by the
dissent, opined Justice Thomas, was the Court's praise for the constitutional separation of powers between the states and the federal government. Id. (quoting Gibbons,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195). Justice Thomas clarified this misunderstanding by stating
that the Constitution was merely expressing that national concerns were delegated to
Congress, while local concerns were delegated to the states. Id. at 1647-48 (Thomas,
J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Thomas denied an interpretation that would grant
Congress power to regulate any activity it believed was a national matter. Id. at 1648
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas proceeded to list "war, taxes, patents, and
copyrights, uniform rules of naturalization and bankruptcy" as matters that were
under Congress's regulatory control. Id. (citing U.S. CONST., art. I., § 8).
146 Id. Justice Thomas explained that prior to the landmark decision in Gibbons,
Congress's power could only be exercised in "places where it enjoyed plenary powers." Id. Continuing, Justice Thomas stressed the efforts made by the Court, during
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, to continually strike down federal legislation
that attempted to regulate manufacturing. Id. at 1648, 1649 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
147 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1648, 1649 (Thomas, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice
Thomas indicated that the decisions, in the time period between the ratification of
the Constitution and the mid-1930s, reflected the limited powers held by the federal
government. Id. at 1649 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas declared the
"wrong turn" in Commerce Clause jurisprudence to which the principal dissent al-
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would lead to a general police power created in the federal government, something not provided for in the Constitution.148
Justice Stevens, in a terse dissent, stressed that the future of
our country's commerce is crucially dependent upon the educational system. 14 9 Therefore, Justice Stevens proclaimed, Congress
could regulate possession of guns, alcohol, and controlled substances in and around schools. 50 Moreover, Justice Stevens labeled guns as articles of commerce as well as articles that restrain
commerce." 1 Lastly,Justice Stevens remarked that the national interests at the time the Constitution
was created are not relevant to
15 2
the interests of today.

Also dissenting, Justice Souter emphasized the Court's use of
luded, to be those decisions following the 1930s in which the Court departed from
150 years of precedent. Id.
148 Id. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring). This general police power, noted Justice
Thomas, was a direct result of the Court's "substantially affects" test. Id. Justice
Thomas revealed that the principal dissent failed to express a single instance in which
the federal government would be limited in its Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 1649
(Thomas, J., concurring). Developing the principle depicted in Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968), Justice Thomas stated that "one always can draw the circle
broadly enough to cover an activity that when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce." Id. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring). Therefore, Justice Thomas cautioned that taking this approach to its logical conclusion, Congress
could enact an all-encompassing "substantially effects" Commerce Clause legislation
that would regulate each element of human existence. Id. Concluding, Justice
Thomas offered the metaphor of a "blank check" to describe such an approach maintained by the principal dissent. Id. at 1651 (Thomas, J., concurring).
149 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Stevens expressed his agreement with the principal dissent. Id. Justice Stevens also concurred
with Justice Souter's dissent, finding the majority's decision "radical." Id. (citation
omitted).
150 Id. Approximately 135,000 students carried handguns each day while attending
school in 1987. 135 CONG. REc. E3988 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989) (statement of Hon.
Edward F. Feighan). Another 270,000 students carried a handgun once to school in
1987. Id. Over 5000 secondary school teachers are threatened or physically attacked
each month. Id. See also Herman Schwartz, United States v. Lopez; The Feds Lose a
Piece of Their Rock; Courts Tries to Patrola PoliticalLine, LEGAL TIMES, May 8, 1995, at 25
(noting that 4% of American students carry guns to school, 6% of inner-city students
carry guns to school, 12% of students have fired guns while in school and 20% of
students have used guns to threaten others while in school). Moreover, roughly eight
percent ofjunior high and high school students reported missing school out of fear.
Id. Further, schools have been forced to take affirmative action to help children handle the gun violence present in local schools, such as practicing gunfire drills, constructing protective walls surrounding the school, and holding special classes
designed to inform kindergarten students about the danger of guns. Id.
151 Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id. Justice Stevens noted that in 1789, the market for school children possessing
handguns was nonexistent, while such a market in today's society is, distressingly, significant. Id.
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the rational basis test as a "paradigm of judicial restraint."15 3 Noting that the majority decision deviated from the Court's modem
view of the Commerce Clause, Justice Souter expressed concern
that the majority's decision would lead to further destruction of
that restraint. 154 While retracing the history of the Court, Justice
Souter noted a similarity between the Court's Commerce Clause
and Due Process Clause jurisprudence. 5 5 Justice Souter expounded on the creation and utilization of the rational basis test,
through both the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. 156 While
acknowledging that the rational basis test brought stability to issues
involving the Commerce Clause, Justice Souter expressed concern
that the immediate decision portends a regression to the untenable jurisprudence before the adoption of the rational basis
57
standard. 1
Continuing, Justice Souter explained that the Commerce
Clause power should be plenary.1 58 In concluding that such power
may be used as a valid means of regulating firearm possession in
schools, Justice Souter admitted that the connection to interstate
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Souter,J., dissenting).
Id. at 1652 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained that a history of the
Commerce Clause demonstrated the Court's deviation from the modem view of the
Commerce Clause. Id.
155 Id. Specifically, Justice Souter proclaimed that in 1937, the year the Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court abandoned the
expansive protectionist precedent of contractual freedom by rejecting a Due Process
Clause challenge against a state law imposing minimum wages for women and children. Id.
156 Id. Justice Souter indicated that the change in the Court's analysis with regard
to the rational basis standard and the Commerce Clause was subsequent to that involving the Due Process Clause, because of the adoption of the "cumulative-effects"
theory expressed in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 127-29 (1942). Id. Justice
Souter remarked that the "cumulative-effects" theory was lauded and, thus, the
Court's approach was not altered for a number of years. Id. Continuing, Justice Souter noted that the Court eventually altered the approach taken with regard to civil
rights issues. Id.; see supra notes 79-83 (discussing the civil rights cases).
157 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that with
the adoption of the rational basis standard of review, the Court has never, prior to the
immediate decision, taken steps to return to the "pre-rational basis" days, in either
Due Process or Commerce Clause analyses. Id. at 1653 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justice
Souter proceeded to describe the majority's decision as a return to the direct-indirect
approach vacated nearly 60 years ago. Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158 Id. Justice Souter expanded his analysis by stating that the Court has set forth
maxims that determine intent where certain legislation fails to address intent. Id. at
1655 (Souter,J., dissenting). One such maxim dealing with federal criminal statutes,
noted Justice Souter, is that the Court, when faced with two conceivable interpretations, will select the alternative that "does not force us to impute an intention to
Congress to use its full commerce power to regulate conduct traditionally and ably
regulated by the States." Id.
153
154

1996]

NOTE

929

commerce is obscure.1 5 9 Justice Souter noted, however, that the
Court must still abide by the rational basis standard of review. 6 °
Accordingly, the Justice agreed with the principal dissent that
161
§ 922(q) passed the Court's rational basis review.
Writing for the principal dissent, Justice Breyer concluded
that § 9 2 2 (q) falls within Congress's Commerce Clause power as a
rational means to regulate interstate commerce.162 The Justice began by outlining the three principles used to reach this conclusion:
the broad power to regulate commerce between the states, the "cumulative-effects" theory, and the duty of the Court to grant Congress deference in
enacting legislation.163
Justice Breyer
maintained that Congress had a rational basis for its attempt to
regulate firearms in local schools. 6 6 The Justice continued by atId. at 1656 (Souter, J., dissenting).Justice Souter suggested that a challenge to a
federal regulation involving interstate garbage hauling, for example, would present a
much clearer issue. Id.
160 Id. The question for the Court, added Justice Souter, was not whether Congress
found a particular activity to substantially affect interstate commerce, nor was it
whether Congress was correct in such a finding. Id. Rather, Justice Souter maintained the question for the Court was whether such legislative judgment was "within
the realm of reason." Id. Justice Souter further expressed the notion that express
legislative findings are not necessary in order to sustain legislation. Id. at 1655-56
(Souter, J., dissenting). See Maloney, supra note 27, at 1817 (discussing the relevance
of legislative findings).
161 Lapez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter deferred to the
principal dissent, see infra notes 162-71, stating that under such findings, there can be
no doubt that Congress had a rational basis for such a regulation. Id. Justice Souter
remarked that the majority's decision should not be regarded as a significant departure from the general trend of the Court's rulings supporting the powers of Congress
to regulate relevant activities under the Commerce Clause. Id. Justice Souter noted,
however, that while National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1936), did not expressly overrule the direct-indirect standard set forth in
A.LA. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the decisions following
Jones & Laughlin Steel indicated to the contrary. Id.
162 Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 1657-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer stipulated that the term
"significant" would be used instead of the term "substantial" when referring to effects
on interstate commerce. Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
The reason for this, noted Justice Breyer, was that "substantial" implied a narrower
power than recent Supreme Court decisions have granted. Id.
Justice Breyer stated that the Court must consider not a single gun possession
but the overall effect of every gun possession on interstate commerce. Id. at 1658
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Continuing, Justice Breyer suggested that the Court must
grant Congress great latitude when determining the requisite nexus between a regulated activity and interstate commerce. Id. Furthermore, Justice Breyer believed that
the term "rational basis" effected such latitude. Id.
164 Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). First, Justice Breyer recognized that Congress need not make particular findings in order to legislate. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). However, Justice Breyer introduced considerable reports, articles, and
studies evidencing the effects of gun possession and the relation between gun posses159
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tacking the majority's contention that § 9 22(q) unduly expanded
16 5
the scope of federal power pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Justice Breyer claimed that, if upheld, the Court would simply be
applying existing law and precedent to changing economic
16 6
circumstances.
Justice Breyer expressed three distinct legal problems created
by the majority's decision.167 First, noted Justice Breyer, the immediate decision runs afoul of the Court's modern trend of affording
deference to Congress in situations with less direct involvement to
interstate commerce. 1 68 Second, argued Justice Breyer, the majority incorrectly makes a distinction between what is and what is not a
commercial transaction.1 6 9 Finally, the Justice maintained that the
majority's decision creates uncertainty to what was previously consion and interstate commerce. Id. at 1659-60, 1665-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
statistics of the studies, reported Justice Breyer, indicated that "several hundred thousand schoolchildren are victims of violent crimes in or near their schools" each year.
Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra note 150 (reporting statistics of students
carrying, shooting, and threatening others with guns). Thus, Justice Breyer concluded that Congress, armed with such reports, could have acquired a rational basis
for regulating gun possession in and around schools. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer offered the proposition that the educational
system directly affects commerce; more specifically, commerce between the foreign
nations. Id. at 1659-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer explored this proposition by noting that education was initially
acquired in the workplace. Id. Continuing, Justice Breyer expounded on how the
country's educational system is directly linked to industrial productivity. Id. at 1660
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer stressed the need for greater quality in American education to maintain a competitive level with Asian and European students. Id.
Moreover, Justice Breyer suggested that more businesses are likely to base their operations in areas where there is a work force equipped with sufficient education. Id. at
1660-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). If there are not enough qualified workers, warned
Justice Breyer, businesses will move out of the United States. Id.
165 Id. at 1662 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer relied on Perez in stating that
the majority ignored precedent that upheld federal legislation with a weaker nexus to
interstate commerce. Id. MoreoverJustice Breyer compared Katzenbach to the immediate case. Id. In Katzenbach, noted Justice Breyer, the Court upheld congressional
legislation applicable to restaurants because it was determined that the food served in
the restaurant traveled through interstate commerce. Id. The Court further concluded that in Katzenbach, it was determined that African-Americans were less likely to
travel through interstate commerce knowing that food would be difficult to obtain. Id.
Hence, Justice Breyer questioned the majority's reasoning, stating that book suppliers
sell less books and school supplies when the educational process is continually affected by gun violence. Id. at 1663 (Breyer, J., disseneting).
166 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1662 (Breyer,J., dissenting) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964)).
167 Id.
168 Id.; see supra notes 92-100 (discussing United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
169 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer disagreed with
the majority that the decisions in Wickard, Perez, and Katzenbach were decided on economic terms. Id. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Rather, opined Justice Breyer,
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sidered a settled area of law.' 70 In conclusion, Justice Breyer contended that the Court should have recognized the rational basis for
Congress's belief that there is a significant connection between interstate commerce and firearm possession in and around local
schools.

17 1

It is axiomatic that a properly functioning society must have
laws that punish individuals for the crimes they commit. It is also
clear that the United States, a nation that prides itself on the fundamental principles of liberty, freedom, and justice, is overwhelmed by a crime wave that is increasing annually. 72 One
understands, therefore, that Congress would want to take affirma173
tive steps to address these problems.
It is undisputed, however, that Congress has, with increasing
frequency, been enacting criminal legislation regulating conduct
that is also the subject matter of state criminal legislation. 7 7 Despite the good intentions of Congress, it was inevitable that the
Court would finally agree to decide a criminal conduct case that
presented a clear issue regarding Congress's Commerce Clause
power and the states' police powers under the Tenth Amendment.
In analyzing the various opinions in Lopez, it is important to
the Court's focus in those cases concerned whether the particular activity substantially
affected interstate commerce. Id.
Moreover, Justice Breyer noted that it is improper to make a distinction in this
case between educational and commercial activities. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer proffered that schools provide both educational and commercial
skills. Id. Thus, Justice Breyer concluded, the line between education and commerce
is impossible to draw. Id.
170 Id. Justice Breyer noted that Congress has enacted a considerable amount of
laws that contain the phrase "affecting commerce" to characterize their scope. Id. See
Harvey Burkman, Supreme Court HeadingFor the Home Stretch; Commerce Clause Reaches
Limit in Gun Zone Ruling, NAT'L L.J., May 8, 1995, at A14. Lamenting, Justice Breyer
stated that the majority's decision will impede Congress's ability to create criminal
laws that affect the nation both economically and socially. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1665
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
171 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1665 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra notes 149, 150-52 (noting Justice Stevens's similar reasoning).
172 See generally supra note 150 (offering statistics on school gun violence).
173 See generally Constance Johnson, When Washington Takes on Crime, Its Bark is Far
Worse than Its Bite, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 28, 1994, at 35 (noting that there
are more than 3000 federal criminal statutes); Naftali Bendavid, How Much More Can
Courts, Prisons Take?; It's Tempting to Federalize Crimes, But Opponents Are Gathering Momentum, LEGAL TnAnss, June 7, 1993, at 1 (stating that "the quickest and easiest way to
respond to something that's been defined as a major problem is to federalize it");
Raven, supra note 23, at 12 (noting that the federal government has doubled the
number of prosecutors between 1980 and 1990).
174 See Raven, supra note 23, at 12 (noting that the American politicians have
"waged war" on crime, "essentially creating an entire body of law that duplicates state
criminal codes").
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remember that at the time the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q), over forty states had laws proscribing gun
possession within local school zones.' 7 5 Thus, the criminal conduct that Congress was attempting to regulate was already heavily
regulated by the states. In short, Congress was attempting to fix
something that did not need fixing. Therefore, the majority opinion of the Lopez Court must be lauded. Also laudable was the willingness of some members of the majority to reject previously held
views espousing judicial restraint and stare decisis. 76
It is regrettable, however, that the majority, while making such
a momentous decision, tainted the message by emphasizing the
narrowness of its holding. The Court should have seized the opportunity to give better guidance and clarity regarding past Commerce Clause cases that continue as precedent, although arguably
inconsistent with Lopez. 177 This especially holds true as the most
recent Commerce Clause decisions have been decided by five-tofour votes.1 78 With the change of one member of the Court, a future case could likely reverse the Lopez decision, thereby creating
79
further confusion in an already confusing area.1
Instead of delivering a clear directive to Congress to refrain
from enacting unnecessary federal laws in areas already sufficiently
covered by the states, the Court has provided Congress a protocol
to use when adopting legislation that will ensure its validity. This
will almost certainly lead to more federal regulation and diminished state power, a circumstance never intended by the Framers of
the Constitution.
Douglas A. Stevinson

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See, e.g., id. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Lopez decision was
necessary in order to abandon the "substantially affects" test).
177 See id. at 1634 (stating that "the broad language in these opinions has suggested
the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further");
see also id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stressing the Justice's hesitation with joining the
majority and emphasizing the limited holding of the Court); Greenhouse, supra note
102, at 1 (acknowledging that the Court, during the past term, muddled holdings
with notes of equivocation and compromise).
178 See, e.g., supra note 99 (discussing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
179 See Lacayo, supra note 102, at 48 (quoting former United States Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan, who said that "[flive votes can do anything around here").
175
176

